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The public terrain of formal decision-making in the
Eastern Cape reserves between 1945 and 1968 was racked by
state intervention and internal dissension. Location
inkundlas and the regional Bunga were shot through with
the tensions of men engaged in the ongoing construction of
power in the face of rapidly diminishing resources of
land, cattle and labour. Increasingly, male authority was
unsettled by signs that orderly control over the domestic
domain was becoming more complex as women transgressed
established boundaries of gendered control.2 Men - in the
household, inkundla, Bunga and Bantu authority - responded
by reaffirming the division between public and domestic
domains while participating in the constant reconstruction
of male authority in both. This separation of male control
into distinct but enmeshed domains facilitated the
construction of a male dominated social order, mediated by
state intervention in the public domain.
Following the end of the second World War, the Native
Affairs Department (NAD) continued to use the Bunga as the
interface between white officialdom and the 'native
locations'. The educated Bunga representatives, janus -
like, translated NAD policy into African discourse; but
the real chain of command from the Minister of Native
Affairs was through the Native Commissioners to the
location headmen. Relations between the NAD, the Bunga and
the headman remained uneasy, constantly undermined by
lagging wartime scarcities and inefficiency on the part of
the NAD. Thus Bunga men struggled to hold on to the little
credibility they had among location men. Nor did their
particular construction of male power provide a convincing
model for the younger generation. With Apartheid state
intervention after 1951, African male authority was
reinscribed in the discourse of ethnic identity and
Bantustan administrative machinery.
Women remained formally excluded from public power. They
were denied access to the Bunga and permitted to enter the
inkundla only as objects of review by the male forum. This
structural division into distinct domains enabled the
public male discourse to remain largely silent on women.
Nor did women's talk transgress the social order;
grievances were expressed as particular and personal.
Rather than simply reproducing this dichotomy, this paper
seeks to explore and explain the public/private dualism.
It is argued that the public and domestic were not only
enmeshed but the divide was constantly reconstructed in
the interests of maintaining a. male dominated social
order. Moreover, the form and content of decision-making
in the male forums served to maintain this bifurcated
gender system.
However, since the public/private dichotomy is treated as
'natural' and unproblematic by white officialdom, the
dualism permeates the offical records. The gaps in the
sources are chasms: official sources treat women as absent
from the public domain while the domestic is portrayed as
static and unchanging. This presents a daunting challenge
for the demonstration of the reciprocal construction of
gender and politics.
The paper is arranged in four parts around the dominant
locii in which male power was constructed in the period
1945-1968. The first section explores tensions in the
ongoing construction of male authority in the domestic
domain, separate but enmeshed with the public. The second
part looks at the construction of gentlemen's power
through the Bunga system and the third explores the
conflict between inkundla men and NAD officials as a locus
for the construction of African men's authority. Part four
explores ways in which Bantu Authorities reinvented
ethnicities and created new forms of aale power. In each
section, I attempt to draw out the reciprocal
constructions of gender and politics.
Part onat constructing aala authority ia tba privata
doaain
Long-established rules that had helped to construct a
social distance between women and men in Eastern Cape
African society came under increasing pressure in the
period after HH2. Lobola was viewed with less sympathy by
a NAD desperate to enforce stock culling and land
rehabilitation; the Native Divorce Court held out the
option of dissolving a marriage without paternal consent.
Experience of urban life played havoc with the once
hallowed rules of respect expected of young wives. Thus,
marriage by lobola, adherence to intlonipho language rules
and the exclusion of women from the inkundla, the key
clusters of control that muted women's self and political
expression, were under pressure in the post-war period.
Nevertheless, men continued to construct their authority
in and through domination over women in both the domestic
- *where men had powers over everybody' and in the public
domain - 'where what was agreed among men was final'. If
continuity in the construction of male power was not
achieved through the acquiesence of women, coercion and
even brutality might be employed.
Both male and female desire for respect from society
clearly encouraged conformity and the maintainance of
rules that governed this order - 'a woman expected
punishment if she did not follow her husband's orders'8.
But the deterioration of the reserve economy and increased
occillating migration to the centres of urban employment
meant that neither women nor men were unable to conform so
readily to the ways of their parents. By 1946, 29% had no
cattle, 30% were landless and 60% had five or fewer
cattle.10 For young men this meant holding onto authority
without the certainty of cattle or land; for young women
it often meant *taking men's punishment' and seeking new
(sub)ways within the male dominated order.11
Since women had no access to the forums of public power,
where men *spoke for them', their own responses to male
authority were generally visible only in the private
domain.12 But even here, 'womon discussed only what was
expected of them' and a woman who defied authority did so
on her own.13 Defiant women thus invariably acted in
isolation, undermining the power of mothers- and sisters-
in-law as much as that of men. While women sometimes
expressed a desire for change such as a tempering of the
excesses of male power or the exercise of mutual respect,
their pleas did not easily permeate the walls between the
male and female domains. Thoso women who sought a
softening of the rules by which this division was
maintained, were condemned to live in the interstices of
location life while the men rcisorted to the increasingly
violent exercise of their powcir.
Let us consider the case of Sltuwe Ngayi. Her 'plea' began
with a public statement in the cattle kraal and ended in a
trial for murder in the Supreme Court. Her experience
points to the difficulty of permeating the divide between
domestic and public, a barrier that women had to cross if
they were to be heard.
The court record tells us that early in the New Year of
1946 forty eight pounds and ten sheep were exchanged as
lobola between the emissaries of two fathers. The bride
was taken, protesting, to her new home. The ululating of
older women was not able to drown the bride's anguish and
determination, however. 'I do not want to be the wife of
this place', Situwe Nqayi cried, throwing off her ochre-
coloured blankets and running naked into the cattle
kraal.1*
This public denouncement was not only a rejection of the
•an who had provided the lobola, but of her father who had
accepted this payment. In repudiating her marriage in this
way, Situwe Nqayi was acting in accordance with legal
custom at the time; her marriage should be annulled. With
the issue pushed into the public domain, residents made
sure that the headman was called to ratify that 'custom'
was carried out. Accordingly, he told the girl to go home
to her father's homestead as she was no longer married.
Situwe was on her way home when three men rushed out from
behind the kraal and dragged her back to her 'husband's'
hut. Her 'mother-in-law' shouted, 'You can do what you
like but you are going to remain here as the wife of the
kraal.'15 In so doing, she pulled the case back into the
private domain where mothers-in-law controlled young
wives. The headman did not intervene, leaving the
household to sort itself out.
Four men tied Situwe onto the floor with cattle riems. So
splayed and unable to move, she was easily raped by her
'husband'. When the cattle riems were loosened the next
morning, Situwe covered her face with dung, stripped and
once again ran into the cattle kraal to repudiate the
marriage. While *custom' would have upheld the
repudiation, the headman later told the court, the man who
had paid lobola for her did not. The headman, it seems,
was unwilling for his public authority to enter domestic
terrain, particularly if there was a chance of the older
woman gaining control over the younger and reinforcing the
divide between domestic and public.
The Supreme Court Judge informs us that Situwe then
plotted to run away. This was apparently also the belief
of her 'husband' who followed her into the forest where
she said she was going to chop wood - her duty as a
daughter-in-law. As her 'husband' kept watch, Situwe crept
up behind him and sunk her axe into his head.16
Situwe was sent to a reformatory for eighteen months,
there to come under the protection and tutelage of white
'civilisation'. The judge's anger was reserved for African
•en. First, he reprimanded the young men whose contempt
for the court revealed disdain for the white man's
intervention in the African domestic domain. ' Then he
warned the girl's father that he would be arrested and
thrashed should he 'sell her again to some man for sheep
or cattle.'18 In both instances, the judge exercised his
control as an official of the white supremacist state. He
upheld the right for white men to control black men and to
usurp black male control over their women.
Significantly, Situwe herself did not repudiate the lobola
system. Her demand was for her rights and protection under
customary law. Her father and husband had failed to
observe those rights. Moreover, coercion of reluctant
girls was common practice in the region, the headmen
informed the court. In this event, going public and
thereby compelling the headman to intervene to perform his
duty, was the girl's next customary option. But the
headman had shown that custom was to be exercised in the
interests of male authority; the wall between public and
domestic was not to be rendered porous.
This case reveals starkly how male authority per se came
to be exercised qua custom and came to be perceived as
custom. If there was a dilemma for the headman, there was
no sign of anguish, nor remorse after the event. Nor did
the headman seek advice. The Native Commissioner was never
informed. 9 From the point of view of women, the headman
and indeed, custom as it was exercised by these selfish
men, had failed.20 However, confining the case to the
domestic protected male authority in general and enabled
individual men to deal with the problem outside of the
public domain. The headman clearly knew when it was
strategic to stand back.
Situwe's experience reveals the coercion inherent in the
construction of male authority through domination over
women. Laid bare in the public court room, the privacy of
the bedroom was opened to scrutiny. The recourse of male
power to violence was exposed. If the expression of
aggression was extreme, it sprung from a notion that once
thwarted, male authority was to be restored through
violence. Beyond this, the case makes apparent that the
private domain could only be constructed within and
through a public domain that shaped its space. Moreover,
male authority in the public domain rested on this
construction of a dichotomous social order. Men's public
authority was underpinned by thair control over women in
the private domain. The managing of this tension between
public and domestic continuously served the construction
of male domination.
Constructing fraal* forbcarano*
If male coercion of women was a final resort in the
construction of male domination over women, the practice
of intlonipho ensured that women developed the
forbearance for their restriction and exclusion.
Intlonipho was thus also a meann of regulating the
interface between public and private, male domination and
female subordination.21 Anxious for marriage, children and
social acceptance, many women observed intlonipho rules in
the 1940s. Indeed, they were proud of this feat,
disparaging those who opted out.22 But for many others,
young women, educated and worldy wise, marriages
constructed on unquestioning respect and duty were no
longer adequate. These young women had come to see and
talk of a world that did not fit easily with silent
acceptance of aale control. Experience of a more
independent youth not only provided enabling cognitive
skills but added impetus to the articulation of
frustrations with prescribed notions of femininity. Some
women, such as Yaliwe Skatsha, spoke out against women's
subordination through the practice of intlonipho.
As a young woman in the 1940s, Yaliwe had won beauty
competitions, enjoyed dancing and knew that life could be
fun. Then she was 'twalaed' (abducted), and her father
agreed to her marriage. Yaliwe did not oppose the marriage
since the man was her lover. But marriage sanctioned a new
form of male domination over her. Intlonipho was the means
by which this was accomplished. Hot only did adherence to
this practice mean averted eyes, avoiding the cattle kraal
and silent obedience, but denying her own needs. This
enabled her man to take new lovers while she kept the
home. When she complained, he beat her. When she ran away
to her father's home, 'he would find a cow' to secure her
return. Other young wives whom she met at the water tap,
had similar complaints, but they would not speak out. The
only women Yaliwe had legitimate access to were those who
colluded with men in the construction of the system:
After my marriage, I was told by my sisters-in-
law not to make friendship with people of my age
but only with older wives; young people would
teach me wrong things while older wives would be
helpful. All those whom I asked to help me told
me that perseverance was important. They told me
that that they had experienced the same bad
times.23
Yaliwe became convinced that 'men used intlonipho to
repress women' while they justified their own 'arrogant
and self-centred' behaviour.24 Yaliwe finally divorced her
husband, but she remained isolated in a community where
the majority of women were not prepared to support her
stand against the practice. 'It's because their minds are
still trapped, it is like something they were born with,
it's embedded in their minds.' However, while other women
confirmed that they had endured similar experiences, they
believed that they had chosen the status of marriage,
rather than been trapped. For this status women had to
suffer.25 Yaliwe's wish was that women would 'unite in
saying that intlonipho is wrong; if it is necessary men
must practice it as well' was not shared by many. However,
she had no doubt that her children shared her desire for
reciprocity and would demand a mutual form of respect.26
However, since the MAD too, through the 'Mative law and
Custom' recognised by the Native Administration Act of
1927 upheld women's exclusion from political forums the
space into which articulate women might move independently
of men was heavily circumsribed. Magistrates anxious to
avoid being drawn into domestic location affairs were also
careful to refer cases brought by women back to the
headman.28 Thus white male officials effectively colluded
with black men to maintain a male dominated, bifurcated
social order both in the construction of legislation and
in the administration of the reserves.
The powerful presence of men in the domestic demonstrates
the ongoing construction of co-terminous domains as
facilitating the reproduction of male power and authority.
This conceptualisation of domestic and public, gender and
politics, goes against prevailing accounts that avoid
examining the nature of the relationship between domestic
and public.29 Thus, for example, Hammond-Tooke discusses
cases involving women in the inkundla as examples of
headmanship skill without examining the relationship
between male consensus and women's place.
Part TwoiThe Bunga - Training in Dcaoaraoy?
The central forums of public debate in the Ciskei reserves
in the post WW2 era were the exclusively male Bunga and
inkundla. The Bunga was an elected body of educated men
presided over by white Native Commissioners; the inkundla
was inclusive of all adult men in a rural location. Thus
outside of the inkundla, and parallel to it, the Ciskeian
General Council (the Bunga) constituted a domain of
masculine power and identity construction for an educated
sub-elite.
The Glen Grey Act of 1894 provided the initiating
legislation for the Bunga, a three tiered system of local
and district councils and a general council, but it was
not until 1934 that the first councils were elected.30 The
Bunga system was intended as a sop for the educated men
who were about to lose the franchise. African women
remained voteless, the enfranchisement of white women in
1930 notwithstanding. The inkundla, its powers heavily
curtailed by the Native Administration Act, was a locus
for the continuity of 'custom' and its service in the
construction of male authority. Tensions between these two
male forums were never far from the surface, the issues of
power and control constantly contested.
Moreover, the NAO's parallel administrative system
constructed social, relationships through an elaborated
language of binary opposites. Like academic studies of the
time, NAD officials designated communities as red or
school, heathen or Christian; leadership was backward or
progressive; decision-making and administration rested on
consensus or command styles.31 This language stressed the
opposite poles of social relationships; it reproduced
dichotomies rather than problenatising the construction
and maintainance of these binary oppositions. It was a
language deployed in the desire to 'know', administer or
'civilise', adopted by white officials and Bunga men
alike; it helped to construct perceptions of class.
However, these linguistic oppositions not infrequently
subverted and undermined the parallel administrative
structure by setting hierarchical forums against each
other. 'Bunga' in some areas became a symbol for all that
was against cattle and inkundla authority; 'Bunga' was a
call to revolt.
For white NAD officials, the Bunga was a forum for
promoting Western ideas of 'progress'. Moreover, by
granting the responsibilities of local government to
educated men rather than to headmen and chiefs, the idea
of the Bunga was at once divisive and paternalistic. It
extended the red-school dichotomy to the administrative
level, setting the Bunga up against the inkundla. Cr AM
Jabavu of Tamacha, gave expression to the tension
generated by this dualism. 'Councils were the first
official representatives of the people. Yet headmen are
given power to consult in regard to some very important
aspects of people's life.' Moreover, Jabavu added, as he
distanced himself from the inkundla, 'Some of those
aspects are of an academic nature and it is ridiculous to
ask a raw native to pass an opinion on academic
questions.'
Bunga councillors thus constructed themselves against the
inkundla as an embattled rural intelligentsia. They sought
to carve out a space for them»elves as 'enlightened',
progressive leaders. But the domain in which they operated
was a minefield criss-crossed by the layers of the NAD
administration system -inkundla, Native Trust and the
Bunga.33 Caught between their white overseers and the
poorly educated men of their constituencies, Bunga
councillors offset themselves against both white and 'red'
men. If less educated men failed to understand enlightened
views, Native Commssloners who undermined Bunga leadership
by going directly to rural locations to win over support,
failed to understand democracy. Cr Jabavu set out the
problem:
I am of a different class to the red native. I
know what is the danger in the law and what to
revise...Democracy is something that has come
from the white man and it is undemocratic to cut
the ground from under the feet of the
representatives of the people...I personally,
and some of my colleagues here, cannot count on
dual consultation with the people. I do not
blame the officials so much. I blame bad
legislation...we are mere figureheads in this
council and we might as well stay at home and
not come here.34
While Cr Jabavu dissociated himself froa the dualism of
the NAO's administrative system, like most Bunga
Councillors, he clearly located himself within the
red/school discourse in which the Bunga was heavily
inscribed. Like many councillors he saw himself as 'not
red', engaging in a process of 'othering' that helped
reinforce and maintain social distance while providing
space for a patronising paternalism. Some councillors
invoked the Native Trust as 'our father'. They used the
red/school opposition to remind the NAD of the
possibilites of 'civilising' through continuing the
feeding scheme begun in the 1946 drought. 5 Others sought (
to deploy educated women in the mission of civilising
their 'red' counterparts, requesting that trained women
be appointed as Home Demonstrators to educate, upgrade and
generally uplift 'red' women.36
Yet others saw the role of educated women in the
construction of class going beyond that of meting out
charity. Thus, some Bunga men of means, often quitrenters
seeking to pass on their land to dutiful daughters,
repeatedly requested that the table of succession be
amended to allow women to inherit quitrent land.37 While
these men lived in a world increasingly dominated by
private property that extended beyond cattle, the majority
whom they represented lived under communal t*nj|jr«, where
land was allocated by the headman in consultatioj' with the
Native Commissioner. Not surprisingly, they were unable to
convince all those in the Bunga to break with bid notions
of male authority. Moreover, the white Native 'ij
Commissioners invariably supported the interests of male
succession.
This othering of all uneducated women as 'red' obscured
the shifts that were taking place among illiterate women.
Many of those who prided themselves on the distinctiveness
of ochre, were increasingly moving away from traditional
conceptions of masculinity. In some areas they were moving
faster than illiterate men.39 Often concern for JJjeir
children propelled women to break with the past.40 Thus,
Nowinile Hongqo, herself illiterate, argued vehemently
that the only way for her children was through education.
Never having sat in a classroom herself, she dragged her
son from a mine labour recruitment meeting and marched him
back to school. While education created no conflict for
this woman, abandonment of ethnic identity did. To be an
ochre person was to believe in one's heredity. 'What
sickens me', said Nowinile, 'is that people are no longer
proud of their nation, the nation of Rharabe, the nation
of all laws.'41
The NAD's administration also removed old certainties,
awakened desires and created new frustrations. Some of
these insecurities were a direct outcome of the Bunga's
'othering' discourse. 'Red' aen in Bunga discourse were
cast as inimical to democracy- These men were not
considered competent to hold government office to occupy a
place in the Bunga. Nor were they fit to be headmen. Only
•en educated to the level of Std Six should be appointed
headmen the Bunga voted and only 'educated natives' should
be trained as stock inspectors. 2 The tight-fistedness of
the NAD, however, was an obstacle to the implementation of
these ideas. With a salary lower than a 'kitchen girl's',
no educated man wanted the job of headman. Paid lower than
an unmarried woman, male authority was at stake. Thus Cr
Peteni explained,
There are Headmen in my area whom I can not talk
, to, but just point at them...the Headman is
unlike a voter. A voter is a man who has means,
but a headman is a nan picked up by the
location, a man who is prepared to live on a
very meagre salary. 3
Nor were wives keen to accept traditional status over
urban wages. Thus one woman WJIS disgusted that her husband
should be expected to forego a job for the status of
headman. 'Have you brought this man for this nonsense?'
the woman scoffed, 'when he was in Cape Town he was
working for a salary'.44 For this wife, traditional
conceptions of masculinity had to give way to new options
for meeting material needs. By accepting the headmanship,
a Bunga councillor concluded, a man was in danger of
losing 'his dignity and his vary wife!' - emasculated in
the domestic domain by an impoverished public position.45.
If Bunga men believed that theirs was a superior status to
that of inkundla men, they knew they had very little
power. Their authority as 'big men' in the broader rural
community was increasingly undermined by their association
with the patronising NAD. Councillors warned of the
dangers of the Bunga becoming the pawn of a discriminatory
state. They urged the NAD to hear the 'bitter cry of the
people' fed up with the role of the Bunga as 'shield of
the Department'.46 Moreover, as Cr Phooko complained, the
'Europeans' in the Bunga were of little use to democratic
debate. As as 'officials of the government', they could
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not * express their opinions'.47 The NAD thus undermined
its own endeavour and failed to make the Bunga a place of
training in democracy.
If the Bunga had from its inception been wedged between
the Native Commissioners and the inkundla, their role as
outriders for the NAD undermined their authority and
credibility. Bunga men were embattled, desperately seeking
a role for themselves as progressive leaders guiding their
people to enlightenment. As 'yes men', they could not
fulfill this role. As opponents of the government, they
would fall foul of the law. Often alienated from the
cattle-owners who dominated the inkundlas, their
leadership was weak. The discourses and practices of the
Bunga hung uneasily with those of the inkundla, a forum
dominated by the interests of cattle-owning men.
Part Threesinkundla man v« HADsconstructing sal* authority
in and through conflict
The 'territorial unit' of the location and the
*concomitant sense of identification among its residents'
provided the basic administrative unit for the NAD,
location headmen forming the front-line.48 The headman
and his inkundla were the pivot of /Native
Administration'. While this male forum was the 'voice of
the people' in Native Administration, it was heeded only
when these men showed willing to be a conduit for the
NAD.49
Differentiation among headman was thus partially shaped by
character and ideology. Headmen were frequently known by
these attributes and differentiated into 'progressive',
'funzeveni or hotheads' and *weak and ineffectual' by
officialdom and rural men alike. ° A 'progressive' headman
was one who set a good example by following modern farming
methods and remaining *strictly loyal to the
authorities'.51 'Hotheads' were men who opposed the
Bunga, for whom the 'word Trust' stank in their nostrils'
and they were bent on unrestricted accumulation of
cattle.52
The headman of Tyefu's location in Peddie, Alfred Hsutu,
was unequivocally a 'hothead' in these terms. But this was
a hotheadness born of confinement between the inkundla's
desire for hereditary male leadership in a cattle economy
and NAD's power to restrict African men's authority and
capacity to accumulate cattle. While NAD officials tended
to perceive Tyefu men's recalcitrance as mediated by the
headman's character, they underestimated the desire of the
inkundla men to shake off Trust interference. Locked in a
power struggle with the NAD for over two decades, Tyefu's
men increasingly constructed male authority in and through
this process of conflict with the NAD. The intensity of
this struggle in the late 1940s impacted profoundly on the
construction of male identities.
This struggle took a new turn in 1946 when the inkundla
sought to have their deposed headman, popularly regarded
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as a chief, reinstated. Alfred Hsutu had been suspended
from his post as headman on successive occasions since
1933 largely because Tyefu's men, under his leadership,
had refused to participate in elections for the Bunga and
had declared their unwillingnesn to follow the Bunga'a
lead. The banning period expired, the inkundla demanded
his reinstatement. But the Native Commissioner complained
that Hsutu had 'not changed for the better, rather the
reverse'; he was *arrogant and assertive'. Moreover, 'as
long as Msutu remains in Tyefu'u location where he is
regarded as a chief, friction will continue.'54 Clearly,
Msutu continued to project himself as a powerful leader on
his own terms.
The people of Tyefu's location, almost 5 000 adult women
and men according to the 1946 census, continued to regard
him as their hereditary leader and his followers held
inkundla and imbizo meetings at his Great Place.55 This
made it impossible for a headman to operate independently
of this powerful group. For Msutu, it was anomalous that
he should be the only one of seven Mfengu chieftains to go
unrecognised by the NAD so he travelled to Cape Town to
plead his case with Advocate Bowen, a Senator and a white
man of power. The result was a lengthy and eloquent letter
from Bowen to the Chief Native Commissioner of the Cape.
The letter claimed that Msutu had allegedly confessed the
error of his ways, professed understanding of the
complexity of the role of chiefs and headmen in the
administration of Native Affairs and promised to reform.
However, while the statement bore Msutu's X mark, it
revealed aore about Senator Bowen's desires than any views
Msutu might have held.
In Peddle, the Native Commissioner was not convinced of
Msutu's change of heart, but he was pragmatic. The man
acting as headman was of little use to the government,
despite his support for the Bunga. His following was
small, his leadership weak and his principal ally was an
illegitimate half brother, Alfred Giba, whose own status
in the community was in question. When Giba was appointed
sub-headman by his half-brother, the inkundla complained
'that a child whose father we do not know' was 'not fit to
be put at our head'.57 Like his paternity, his authority
and indeed his trustworthiness, was in question. Both his
failure to comply with the principles of hereditary
leadership and fear of this half-white man's loyalty to
his father's people rendered him untrustworthy. Pear of
betrayal thus comingled with ethnicity in this discourse.
But the Native Commissioner continued to insist that
Msutu's reinstatement was conditional on a written
undertaking to co-operate with the NAD. Msutu declined and
was branded 'intractable as ever'.58 Finally, Alfred Giba,
the man of light complexion and unknown father, was
appointed Acting Headman. Not surprisingly, Alfred Msutu
retained all legitimacy. His homestead, the Great Place of
the Ama-Hlubi people of Tyefu's location, remained the
centre of political life.
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By the early 1950s, the oppositional political rhetoric
emanating from Msutu's Great Place took on a new dimension
as it was reinscribed into an African nationalist
discourse. Douglas Msutu, eldest son of Alfred and heir to
the chieftainship, had joined the ANC Youth League. Almost
every weekend, hundreds of residents flocked to Msutu's to
listen to the speeches of Youth league activists from Port
Elizabeth and East London. A key target of the young
militants were the Native Commissioners and Magistrate's
offices, known locally as 'the Bunga'.59 With the tacit
collusion of inkundla elders, these young militants
torched the 'Bunga' offices and the buildings were razed
to the ground for the second time in a decade.60
The appointment of Giba a failure, the Native Commissioner
sought a new mandate and called for nominations for
headman. Douglas Msutu, son of Alfred, received 226 votes,
his opposition, IS.61 But Douglas Msutu, an ANC
'agitator', was not appointed.62 With father and son in
cahoots, the Chief Native Commissioner recognised that the
vote for the younger Msutu was a vote for his father and
hereditary leadership. Defeated, he installed Alfred Msutu
as headman on 24th October 1952, urging him to use his
influence to counter the 'many ignorant people preaching a
violent and subversive doctrine, particularly in this
district of Peddle'.63 Msutu was silent throughout the
proceedings but his inkundla councillors declared that
they would 'now sleep peacefully' since they were no
longer a 'people without their chief and so 'without
their brains'.64 For the men of Tyefu, Msutu's
reinstatement as headman was his installation as chief.
Within months the Native Commissioner complained that
Msutu had taken upon himself the 'rights pertaining to the
Native Commissioner of the District', allocating lands
under his own auspices and refusing to submit to
regulations governing headmen. Msutu, now about 75
years old, was unmoved by the Native Commissioners demands
that he submit to NAD authority. Moreover, the men of
Tyefu refused to elect representatives to the Bunga. There
was no such thing as 'Bunga' or 'Trust' in Tyefu they
declared; these were mere conduits for NAD control.
Consequently, the Minister of Native affairs arranged for
Msutu's deportation. But Msutu went into hiding and it was
some three years before the deportation order could be
served.67
Alfred Giba once again stepped into the breach, to the
distaste of Tyefu's leading men. As 'Alfred Giba is our
illegitimate we hold that in law and in our custom he has
no locus stand!'; Alfred Giba was 'not a native'.68 This
recourse to Mfengu ethnicity was not so much backward-
looking as constructed anew in the conflict between the
inkundla and the NAD, sharpened by the NAD's support of a
man so marginal in Tyefu society. To appoint a man born of
a woman who had gone beyond African male sanction, was
anathema to the inkundla and the women it controlled.
The result was that Tyefu's location was run by the ANC
Youth League with the tacit support of the inkundla
elders. The organisation of the youth reinforced the anti-
colonial hostility of the older generation and drew young
and old into a new alliance.69. Thus, leadership had passed
from one generation to another, the discourse shifting
froo a defense of locale interests to a broader Africanism
imbued with the aspirations of an urbanising youth. The
shift from locale-specific politics to a nationalist
discourse was accomplished with increased militant
resistance to white authority.
Despite the nilitance of inkundla politics at Tyefu's
location, woman continued to remain outside of the realm
of political power. When Tyefu women thwarted police
investigations and defied Trust regulations, they did so
at the behest of their men.70 Thus African nationalist
leaders, like their inkundla elder*, drew on and
perpetuated the divide between public and domestic, their
predominantly male politics constructing women as
followers. Moreover, the conflict between African men and
white male officials became the very locus in which new
forms of male authority and identity were constructed.
Part Fourt Bantu Authorities and Afrioan men's power
Nationalist victory at the polls in 1948 spelled the end
of the Bunga. But not immediately. EG Jansen, the,first
nationalist Minister of Native Affairs announced that the
Council system would be fostered by the Nationalist
Government.71 However, his successor, Dr HF Verwoerd,
believed the Bunga was ineffectual in the face of growing
resistance to rehabilitation and ANC 'propaganda'; it was
also: far too imitative of European, ways.72 Thus, he would
introduce Bantu Authorities as an *alternative machinery
stimulating Bantu development to run alongside' the council
system'.73 Rather than introduce modern western notions of
administration, the Bantu Authorities would 'make use of
the old tribal system, to train the traditional leaders of
the people for the task of governing...in an enlightened
and progressive manner'. 4 Unlike the councils, Bantu
Authorities would 'have to accept responsibility and
executive power' as well as bare the costs of government
services. s
The Bunga rejected the idea of Bantu Authorities - they
would not be party to a return to 'tribalism':
dividing the people into tribes, that does not
appeal to us because now as we are, different
nationalities staying together...Now we would
not like to be divided into different
nationalities. We have stayed long with these
other tribes and now the Government is going to
make confusion.76
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After two years of Bunga resistance, the NAD approached
chiefs and headmen directly, promising that Bantu
Authorities would give them 'greater power'. This
effectively increased authority for those who sought
*enlightenment' deemed 'reds', while it excluded the
Bunga. Not surprisingly, Bunga men slowly began to join
the new system in the hope that they, too, might gain
'higher status and recognition'.78
For the Apartheid state, the demise of the Bunga marked
the end of 'an imported' European form of government
unable to 'produce dynamic leadership for Bantu
progress'.79 Implicit in the Bunga system had been the
notion that Africans, with the appropriate education and
influence were capable of *rational thought' and social
management. They were thus controllable, like whites,
through internal self-management. In the discourse of
Bantu Authorities, 'races' were conceived as 'separately
ordained'; if blacks were capable of governing, then their
system of government was particular and peculiar to
themselves.80 Central to this ideological construction of
Apartheid tribalism was the conviction that effective
ethnic control might facilitate greater economic
exploitation of those lower down in the hierarchy.81
In inventing ethnic histories, the Afrikaner Nationalist
government displayed enormous capacity for manipulating
myths, feeding unrequited desires and fragmenting
identities for political control. Tribes had to be found
to implement the notion that full executive powers were
vested in the 'tribal chief-in-council' ensuring the
emergence of the 'latent power of the Bantu's own
system'.02 The Bantu Authorities system thus introduced a
new set of 'political myths that validate...political
alignments and recruitments to office'.83
The Ciskei reserves provided an enormous challenge for the
configuration of Bantu Authorities. In 1951, these
scattered rural locations constituted neither a
'geographical or tribal entity'.84 There were often
multiple 'tribal' groupings living in a single location
interspersed with 'Coloureds'.85 Settlers on Trust land
came from several districts, those from the farms having
lost many of their customary habits. In some instances,
women took the lead on these new settlements.86 The
'power of the chiefs had gone', and the people were
.'leaderless' claimed the Chief Native Commissioner. '
Moreover, there was only one technically undisputed
hereditary chief living in the Eastern Cape - Chief
Archibald Sandile of the Ngqika (Gaika) branch of the
Rarabe Xhosas.88 However, 'Archie' was a chief without
dignity or means.89 He had neither cattle nor land. His
home was a house with a broken lock, rented to him by the
Trust in Released Area 33. ° He was, in the eyes of the
Chief Native Commissioner, 'wholly unreliable', a man who
drank and did 'nothing else'.91
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Chief Archibald Velile Sandile was nevertheless installed
as Paramount Chief of the Ama-Xhosa in 1958. The process
by which this was achieved reveals the full ingenuity of
the NAD under Apartheid administration. The greatest
impediments to the chief's resucitation were the old-style
Native Commissioners. Indeed, these men had for years
impeded the efforts of the Gaika Tribal Committee, headed
by that ANC stalwart. Reverend James calata, which had
long sought reinstatement of the Xhosa paramount as a
means to regain African diginity. Calata had pleaded with
the Chief Native Commissioner of the Ciskei for 'my
people, the Xhosa...to build up their nationhood on
Traditional lines, so that the evils of Western
civilisation do not destroy them'.92
But the Chief Native Commissioner, with a lifetime's
experience in Native Administration, had not been
enthusiastic. When Verwoerd gave the instruction to
reinstate the Xhosa chief, he objected on the grounds that
there was no longer a material and social context for the
chieftainship.93 The Xhosa were too dispersed.94 The
chief's 'own people', the Ngqika, were not willing to pay
for rebuilding the Great Place. The Chief Magistrate of
the Cape could find no coherence among the Gaika-Xhosa, or
between these erstwhile rulers of the frontier and their
chief.95 Nor did the Middledrift Native Commasloner want
Chief Sandile, a 'wastral and a drunkard', to return to
his birthplace. He would have *nothing but a detrimental
effect on the eventual creation of Tribal Authorities in
the area'.96
However, shortly after the appointment of a pro-Apartheid
Bantu Commissioner, it was announced that Chief Archibald
Velile Sandile would be installed as the head of the
Hngqesha Territorial Authority in the King William's Town
district.97 While there was nothing but a windmill and
resevoir at Hngqesha, a great extravaganza awaited the
impoverished chief.
But first, the tribal history had to be squared with the
Bantu Authorities plan. To ensure a 'tribal separation'
between the Xhosa of the Transkei and Ciskei, it was
desireable that Sandile be elevated to that of paramount
of all the Xhosa outside the Transkei. Fortunately,
'custom permitted...a division between the tribes of the
Great House and the tribes of the Right Hand House',
Zwelidumile Sigcau in the Transkei and Archie Velile
sandile in the Ciskei.98 With that, the Xhosa were
ascribed two paramountcies, one for each Bantu 'homeland'
where the Xhosa language dominated. The Chief Bantu
Affairs Commissioner forthwith applied for over three
thousand pounds for the ceremonies of installing the chief
and establishing a Tribal Authority.99 When the Secretary
for Native Administration baulked, his man in the Eastern
Cape replied:
This event is not one concerning the
installation of a mere chief but the re-
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establishment of a Paramount Chief whose
forefathers were crushed by the authorites who
now desire to welcome a return to the %throne' -
surely there must be much rejoicing and funds
cannot be so limited if the affair is to be what
is desired.109
The desire to reinscribe chiefly power into Bantu
Authorities clearly inspired the programme for the
installation of Chief Archie Velile Sandile. (Al Velilet)
This programme also revealed the fervour with which the
new Bantu Commissioner had sought and gathered the
scattered scraps of Rarabe-Xhosa ethnicity and where
necessary, had filled in the gaps. Notwithstanding the
drunk and unreliable chief, he would create a new Rarabe-
Xhosa ethnicity at Mngqesha, itself of no specific
historic significance for Velile, his ancestors or his
followers. Perhaps as a distraction from this lapse,
attention was paid to ethnic symbols in fine detail. An
order was placed for a gown of leopard skins; Pretoria was
asked to have the 'national emblem of the Rarabe tribe' a
reposed leopard embossed on a 'chair, desk or staff'.101
Ethnic symbols and the image of a return to a precolonial
past were designed to create an aura of 'emancipation'
from white authority.102
The programme for the investiture of this African chief
was shot through with the symbolism and ritual of
Afrikaner nationalism. This was a pageant, the ethnicities
of its joint creators inscribed in the spectacle. Velile's
move to Mngqesha was termed an 'Exodus', his Gaika
escorts, 'Trekkers'. Five Gaika clans escorted the Chief
ceremoniously through Ndlambe territory, white
KingWilliamsTown and across district boundaries stopping
only for a 'braaivleis lunch'. They were saluted at
various times by the mayor, the Kaffrarian Rifles Regiment
(requested to be mounted on horseback) and various Bantu
Commissioners. Velile met the Hlubi, Gqunukwebe and
amaBhele chiefs outside King William's Town and the Hleke,
AbaMbo and Dange Chiefs at Mngqesha. The Rev James calata
led the AmaRanuga delegation at the ceremony. The ceremony
culminated in the installation of the Paramount Chief of
the Rarabe by the Paramount Chief of all the Xhosas,
Zwelidumile Sigcau from the Transkei.103
After the party, bills had to be paid. The Chief Bantu
Commissioner had failed to secure a gift from the state
for the festivities; a loan of four thousand pounds had to
be repaid by the Rarabe-Xhosa. One A.Z. Lamanani of Port
Elizabeth took on the task of fund raising for the Great
Place at Mngqesha, beginning with a Fair at New Brighton.
The ANC, however, issued 'leaflets to every door in New
Brighton', warning people against Bantu Authorities and
'those who used Velile's name to achieve Verwoerd's
ends'.104 Govan Mbeki, intellectual leader of the radicals
of the Port Elizabeth ANC, pointed out that 'Bantu
authority' rested on prohibitions - of political
gatherings, brewing of beer, shouting of war cries or
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blowing bugles and whistles; the 'power' of the new
authorities was confined to policing and collecting
taxes. Defeated, Lamani resigned as the national
organiser of the amaNgqika, his job in jeopardy.106 The
radical wing of the ANC had clearly distanced itself from
the anti-comnunist, Xhosa-Africanism of James calata,
devoted to the cause of Xhosa nation-building.107
Despite opposition, Bantu Authorities were established in
leaps and bounds, reluctance emerging momentarily as one
group felt slighted by another acquiring higher status, as
was the case in Victoria East. This was easily solved,
however, as the Chief Native Commissioner explained:
The ethnical (sic) set-up in this district is
somewhat complex but it is not considered that
this should present any obstacle to the
establishment of Bantu Authorities as the
various tribes are not only ethnically akin but
have become almost completely integrated as a
result of inter-marriage and their community of
interest.108
While constructing ethnicity did not present any
difficulties for the new Bantu Commissioner, his task was
facilitated by small groups of men who sought to use
ethnic difference as a lever to advance their own
interests. This problem was simply solved by the
establishment of three Tribal Authorities in one
district.™
All over the region, groups which had not given ethnic
origin collective expression for decades, emerged to stake
their claim under the Bantu Authorities Act.110 The Chief
Native Commissioner rushed around installing chiefs and
tribal authorities, apparently believing his own
eulogies:*The reserves are areas of liberty for unfettered
optimum development of the Bantu and the stagnating tribes
are becoming progressive communities.'111 "The Bantu', he
believed, would 'taste the sweetness of their own
achievement.'112
On the 13th January 1959, the first Regional Authority was
established in the King William's Town district under
Chief Velile Sandile. Three thousand people attended the
celebration, seventeen head of cattle were slaughtered and
a thousand gallons of beer were provided for *toasts'.113
The Chief Bantu Commissioner gave praise to ethnic
leadership:
Any race or tribe that has no leaders to instil
into it the urge for development and progress in
this period of enlightenment is doomed to become
and remain hewers of wood and drawers of water.
The road to leadership was now open to the
chiefs and councillors...114
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By the end of the year, thirty one Tribal Authorities and
eight Regional Authorities had been created and the
Promotion of Homeland Self-government Act had been
pa8sed.H5 The way was now paved for the establishment of
a Territorial Authority in I960. The Ciskei Bantustan had
been created; the 'Native reserves of the Eastern Cape'
belonged to an obsolete discourse.
This top-down restructuring also ensured that the
potential for inter-ethnic conflict in the Ciskei
Bantustan would be greater than that between African and
the central state. Political and social engineering did
not amount to the distribution of sufficient resources of
land or the means with which to work it. Impoverishment
and overcrowding escalated in the new in the new
territories. In 1960, the %Bantu areas' of the Ciskei
comprised a population of 320,861 risising to 400 000 by
1968, living on some 3353 square miles. The population
density exceeded 100 people to a square mile in many
districts, the highest in the country.116
The newly appointed chiefs and their ethnic authorities
faced a formidable task. But their optimism prevailed as
old powers were harnessed to new ones and the reins of
control passed to their hands.117 Men's power over women
was reinforced. A new tax system extending poll tax to
women extended the fiscal base. Pass laws for women
combined with a system of labour bureaux would ensure
control over Bantustan labour movements.118
Underpinning this restructuring of the public domain was
the assumption that ethnic authority would re-create
women's unconditional respect for male authority. African
men were encouraged to invoke order in the domestic
domain, ensuring that ethnic control rested firmly on a
gendered hierarchy. Often implicit in the injunctions of
Chiefs and headmen as they called their *tribes' to order,
this gendered hierarchy was particularly spelled out on
ritual occasions. Thus Samuel Hqhayi, %Bantu National
Poet' set out the appropriate social ordering of a *Bantu'
society:
That children respect their mothers
Their mothers respect their husbands
The men respect their chiefs
And chiefs respect Qamata.11"
Thus, enmeshed with the state's restructuring of the
public domain of male political authority was the
reconstruction of a domestic domain. This reinforced
dichotomy, as Jardonova has pointed out in the post-
Enlightenment European context, functioned to provide
order in the face of threatening social chaos. 2 0 In the
short-term, prevention of social disruption from the BAD's
point of view, was not to develop productive economic
activities to sustain this hierarchical and bifurcated
social system, but to provide status and power to its key
men.
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The scope for upward mobility for those who had a stake in
the system, was enormous. The new administration would
'need many of the sons and daughters of the Ciskei to fill
new posts', said the Commissioner General for the Xhosa
National Unit.121 The Territorial Authority were promised
that white officials would remain only as long as
assistance was needed. As soon as the Ciskei could be
'safely left to their own people', they would retreat.1"
When Chief Kcakwe suggested that the New Deal might be an
anachronistic step in this * sputnik' age, he was advised
to avoid the disasters of *men like Nkrumah and Lumumba',
to preserve the 'unanimity' of the Ciskei and so prevent
'evil inroads' from 'leftist movements operating
underground.'123 Thus the way was cleared for the men of
the Ciskei Bantustan to become ft new bureaucratic
governing class, expanding as the Bantustan machinery
grew.
When the.Ciskei Territorial Authority convened in 1968 to
accept the government's New Deal of greater legislative
and executive powers, a step towards *self-government',
its chairman, Chief Justice Kabandla of the amaBhele
Mfengu near Alice, declared:
I wish to state on behalf of the Xhosas of the
Ciskei that we have accepted separate
development. He have done so without reservation
because we know it is the only policy that will
work here in Ciskei.124
However, Apartheid restructuring also fostered instability
and uncertainty, fragmenting as much as reinforcing ethnic
identities. Some headmen resigned their posts in protest
at their policing duties.125 Others watched in dismay as
the social order they had come to respect was eroded by
the new. Saddest of all for one missionary-educated man
was that as people recreated ethnic identities, they
brought,in new churches with different and often
conflicting ways.126 Shebeens sprang up, some even
'brewing beer on Sundays'. With drink, the differences
between 'man and boy' began to disappear and 'big men'
walked in fear at night. There was no respect with Bantu
Authorities, only 'grab and take'.127 '.
Moreover, Bantu Authorities restructured the nature of
decision-making within the inkundla, unseating its
consensual character. It became apparent to some men that
1after the introduction of the white inkundla...headmen
took over and gave orders in the locations'. While the
binary opposites consensus-command were more complex than
the separation suggested by Hammond-Tooke, inkundla men
repeatedly cast the new relative to the old, in these
terms.129
A new dominant male power was on the make - men whose
'bigness' came from their ability to manipulate their
ethnic past and to look after their own interests. New
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salary scales raised the standard of living for those who
took jobs with the Department of Bantu Development; the
headmen's power to allocate land free of interference
facilitated demands for graft.130 Those with education
became bureaucrats and civil servants, pragmatists rather
than old-fashioned men of principle, as the Bunga men had
tried to be. Not surprisingly, the contest over who was
'biggest' in the Ciskei was fought out between Mfengu and
Xhosa, a rivalry rekindled after nearly a century, the
Ciskei 'parliament' riven by conflict between these
contending rivalries.
Conclusion
Male authority in the Ciskei reserves after 1945 was
predicated on the continuous reconstruction of a divide
between public and domestic domains. While male power was
derived from men's authority in both domains, the
maintainance of the public as an exclusively male preserve
rested on male control over women in the domestic domain.
Thus the consensual character of male deliberations in the
inkundla was underpinned by the capacity of men to
establish control over women in coercive, even brutal,
ways outside of this forum. The Bunga too assumed a
'natural' division between men and women, ensuring that
women remained external to decision-making forums.
After 1951, Afrikaner nationalism facilitated the
invention of a new »Bantu' male authority. Hale power,
however, continued to rely on and even hardened the divide
between public and domestic domains at least until the
late 1960s. Nevertheless, the exercise of new forms of
male power through the Bantustan machinery also
destabilised old notions of male authority, creating new
possibilities. The Ciskei Bantustan was thus the outcome
of relentless state intervention and the collusion of
beleagured African men desperate to hold on to some form
of male authority. Men's capacity to exercise power rested
on the reconstruction of an authoritarian gendered
hierarchy incorporating a reinforced divide between public
and domestic domains. .
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